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Chinese Indonesians after May 1998
How they fit in the big picture
Dewi Anggraeni
AbstrAct
For Chinese Indonesians, May 1998 is a significant historical marker, twelfth 
and thirteenth being two concentrated days of riots and atrocities in Jakarta, 
followed by more, albeit on smaller scales, in Solo, Surabaya, and a number 
of other cities. Destruction of properties belonging to them, and rapes of their 
women, occurred. Then Indonesia witnessed the end of Suharto’s rule when the 
president resigned on 21 May 1998. A gradual political turn-around followed; 
Chinese Indonesians found room to move. The subsequent governments revoked 
restrictive regulations put in place by the New Order government, and lifted the 
suppression on cultural expression by Chinese Indonesians. The situation has 
progressed in conjunction with China’s rise in global economic dominance. Does 
China’s increasing international profile and rising global economic dominance 
help Chinese Indonesians? This article seeks to find some answer to the question 
as it looks at the development in the big picture; how and to what extent the 
social perceptions of Chinese Indonesians have evolved among the mainstream 
population; how they perceive themselves and believe how others perceive them; 
and how these may influence their lives as Indonesian citizens.
Keywords
Chinese Indonesians; ethnic Chinese; New Order; Peranakan; May 1998; 
Reformasi; SKBRI; ethnic profiling; ethnic markers; media; social media; INTI; 
NABIL; Chinese problems; assimilation; Chinese New Year; China.
106 107Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Dewi Anggraeni, Chinese Indonesians after May 1998
1  How IndonesIA’s socIety evolves After MAy 1998 In relAtIon to Its 
etHnIc cHInese; A glAnce At tHe bIg pIcture
Eighteen years after the May 1998 atrocities, followed by the end of Suharto’s 
rule, Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese who live in big cities, notably in Jakarta, 
Bandung, and Surabaya, have increasingly come to believe that, in terms of 
acceptance by the mainstream society, they are in a better position. For the 
main part of the New Order government which ruled the country from 1966 
to 1998, Chinese Indonesians were consistently singled out and placed under 
the spotlight, painted as the collective cause when explaining most things 
bad, such as being the cause of corruption, thus generating hardships to the 
powerless and voiceless people. Existing negative stereotypical images were 
reaffirmed and endorsed, and new ones were encouraged. 
Very early in its rule, in 1967, the New Order government founded a 
committee with a brief to examine  the “Chinese problem” and find a way 
to resolve it (Purdey 2006: 20), sending a clear message to the public that 
Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese indeed were causing various problems to the 
country and society. The government thus justified itself in issuing  regulation 
after regulation restricting the movement of these people in order to stem the 
damage they have caused and are causing, as well as to prevent them from 
causing further mayhem. In so doing, the government sent a message to the 
mainstream public that it was right to be suspicious and resentful of their 
ethnic Chinese fellow-citizens.
May 1998 is a powerful historical marker based on two main points. 
Firstly, while people may have been desensitized vis-ā-vis destruction of 
properties belonging to Chinese Indonesians as May 1998 was not the first 
time this had occurred, the rapes, some horrifically perpetrated - though still 
officially denied up to the time this article was written - really shocked a great 
number of Indonesians and outraged people in a number of other countries. 
The second point is Suharto, who had then ruled the country for 32 years, lost 
power in May 1998. His fall started the unraveling of a chain of events, which 
are collectively known as Reformasi or social and political reform, one aspect 
of this reform being the gradual dismantling of the “bars” placed around 
Chinese Indonesians, who were then given more and more room to move. 
Seen in the legal context, this gradual liberalization is very significant. 
Some of the landmark laws worth highlighting, passed after the demise of 
the New Order government are:
• Presidential Instruction of 1999, issued by the Office of President B.J. 
Habibie, which officially bans the use of the discriminative terms 
“native” and “non-native” in any official documents and transactions, 
and revokes the requirement for Chinese Indonesians to provide the 
Certificate of Proof of Indonesian Citizenship, known as the Surat Bukti 
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia or SBKRI when seeking to obtain 
official documents and for other important purposes. This Presidential 
Instruction effectively reinforces the 1996 Presidential Instruction, which 
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contains provisions that the SBKRI is no longer required by women 
married to Indonesian citizens, and people under eighteen years of 
age, whose fathers are proven Indonesian citizens,
• Presidential Instruction of 2000, issued by the Office of the next 
president, Abdurrahman Wahid, which removes the ban on ethnic 
Chinese cultural expression, the most prominent being the resumption 
of the Chinese New Year public celebrations,
• Presidential Decree of 2003 issued by the Office of President Megawati 
which declares Chinese New Year as a national holiday,
• Law No. 12 of 2006 on citizenship, issued by the Office of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono which provides that ethnic Chinese who 
are Indonesian citizens are categorized as belonging to one of the ethnic 
groups of the Republic of Indonesia. 
In the social context, it is important to note that neither the 2000 lifting of the 
ban on cultural expression, nor the 2003 inclusion of the Chinese New Year 
in the list of national holidays, met with major opposition from the public. 
And most media organizations, print and electronic, generally supported the 
moves. Chinese Indonesians who responded to this openness were initially the 
relatively few who already had significant political awareness, the majority 
having been  successfully “depolitized” for three decades.  
The response was generally manifested in their greater willingness to take 
part in political discourse, and to a lesser degree, to participate in practical 
politics.
As for those who were slow to respond, being “depolitized” was only one 
reason, another reason being ingrained cautiousness, even distrust, of official 
policies, an attitude learned over decades which were often reinforced by 
numerous instances experienced in their day-to-day lives.1 Laws may have 
been passed, but practices on the ground were a completely different story. The 
widespread belief that it was legitimate and morally right to extort Chinese 
Indonesians was hard to eradicate from the community’s collective psyche. A 
high-profile example is what Susi Susanti, an internationally-known national 
badminton champion, had to experience even during her days of fame. Despite 
being known as a prominent Indonesian sports champion, Susanti always 
had to produce her SKBRI whenever she needed to have official documents 
done. Her mother, who managed the administrative part of her life, related 
to her that it took eight and a half years and multiple visits, applying for her 
SKBRI, as each time her mother submitted the allegedly required documents 
for the application, she was told one or other documents were missing. And 
the on-going administrative costs charged were substantial. When once 
1 Recounted to the author during informal conversations and correspondence by Chinese 
Indonesians from different walks of life, between 1998-2006.
108 109Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Dewi Anggraeni, Chinese Indonesians after May 1998
Susanti asked an official why she, an Indonesian, had to have a certificate 
proving her citizenship, she received an unhesitating reply, “Because you 
are of Chinese-descent”.2
Some fields, especially the public service and politics, were effectively 
barred to persons of Chinese ethnicity during the New Order era. To be in 
these fields, they would have had to conceal their real parentage, or had been 
working in the said fields since a considerable time before 1966, at which point 
they had reached sufficient seniority and proven their mettle. 
One senior public servant who transcended the New Order era, is Dora 
Sasongko Kartono, who began her career as a court officer at the Ministry 
of Justice in 1957, then promoted to the position of Judge for Jogjakarta and 
Magelang. In 1982, she was appointed a High Court Judge. Even so, it was only 
after the demise of New Order did her Chinese parentage was made public, 
and then it was in the context of Ms Kartono contributing to the spectrum of 
diverse background of women high court judges in Indonesia.3
Regardless of the slow process, ethnic Chinese have since been active in 
politics, economic and social commentaries, academia, creative arts, and civil 
service, without having to wear a different identity, regardless of their having 
native Indonesian sounding names or undiluted Chinese names.
Two notable examples of ethnic Chinese who have played important roles 
in politics are: 
Kwik Kian Gie who in 1999 was appointed Coordinating Minister in President 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s Cabinet, though he resigned his position ten months 
later. However between 2001-2004 he was Director of the National Development 
Planning Agency while simultaneously holding a ministerial position in President 
Megawati’s cabinet;4
Mari Pangestu who was Minister of Trade from October 2004 to October 2011, 
who then continued to serve as Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy under 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono until 2014.5 
Generally speaking, Chinese Indonesians who have participated in politics 
and public life have now been largely accepted and publicly recognized, 
some are even lauded and have significant following. More importantly, high 
expectations are placed on their commitments to what they do. Detractors, 
especially those coming from opposing political camps, or rivals in other 
fields, who use the individuals’ ethnicity and accompanying stereotype to 
beat them, are still numerous, but the efforts of these rivals no longer gain as 
much traction as they would have in the times before 1998.
This acceptance however, did not come without setbacks and misgivings. 
2 See Anggraeni (2010: 78-79).
3 See http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4d145b5284d4d/srikandisrikandi-di-
kursi-agung.
4 See Setyautama (2008: 154).
5 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mari_Elka_Pangestu.
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Decades of insinuated and overtly sanctioned prejudice did not wash off 
smoothly. It took a long time and a great deal of introspections and self-
analyses on the part of policy-makers and those who were in a position to 
influence – intentionally or inadvertently – public opinion, for the situation 
to have reached the current stage of mutual acceptance. In many respects and 
indeed in many areas of the country, public opinion and even mere rumors, 
have been able to work locals into a frenzy, in occurrences which should be 
of concern to everybody. They also have played a dubious role in pushing the 
ethnic Chinese in those locallities into a defensive stance displaying unpleasant 
manners which do not invoke sympathy all around.
2 soMe of tHe sIgnIfIcAnt Movers of tHe cHAnge
polItIcAl And publIc fIgures
When a political or a public figure does or utters something in the public 
sphere, intentionally or inadvertently, he or she sends a particular message to 
those who hear it, later read it, hear about it, read about it or hear it reported. 
In this context, when in 1999 President B.J. Habibie issued an instruction 
banning the use of the words “native” and “non-native”, he sent a message 
of exhortation to the public, among other things, to stop singling out Chinese 
Indonesians as the “other”. Thus when he was quoted in August 1998,6 in 
relation to the government’s exhortations to Chinese Indonesian businesses 
to return to Indonesia with their capital – barely three months after the May 
atrocities - saying “I cannot go and take my airplane and beg them and kiss 
them at their feet […]”. The sarcastic tone sent a relatively chilling message 
to Indonesian Chinese, while to the non-Chinese population the message was 
that he was somewhat irritated by the said Chinese. 
When in 2000 President Abdurrahman Wahid removed the ban on ethnic 
Chinese cultural expression, he lent legitimization to the said expression as 
part of being Indonesian. And when he declared on 30 January 20087 and 
quoted in newspapers,8 that he had a Chinese ancestor named Tan Kim Han, a 
Chinese ambassador to Majapahit kingdom, he went even further in including 
the ethnic Chinese in the fabric of the nation.
When in 2003 President Megawati declared Chinese New Year as a 
national holiday, she declared her acceptance of Chinese Indonesians as part 
of Indonesian nation and, encouraged others to do the same.
Conversely, when then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla was quoted saying,9
6 See The Straits Times 5 August 1998.
7 He was at a talkshow “Living in harmony; The Chinese Heritage in Indonesia” set up in 
Mal Ciputra, Jalan S. Parman, West Jakarta.
8 See http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/saat-gus-dur-mengaku-keturunan-tionghoa-
tulen.html.
9 See Sinar Harapan 12 October 2004.
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This is in your interest (Chinese business people – editor), I am saying this to you. 
When you have many poor people, many street-side hawkers shunted left and 
right, who is going to be burned next year? You are. Which one do you prefer? 
Facing discrimination or being burned, being chased out? It’s alright for you, 
you can easily take the money overseas when something like that happens”,10 
he reminded the country’s ethnic Chinese of what could befall them if they 
did not toe the line, or if they complained about any “unfair treatment”, and 
at the same time, Jusuf Kalla conveyed a message to non-Chinese Indonesians, 
that violence on the Chinese Indonesians was not beyond the horizon of 
Indonesian politics and communal life. 
tHe MedIA
May 1998, which practically heralded the end of New Order rule, is also a 
watershed for Indonesia’s media, notably the press, which had until then 
been forced to perform a very skillful pas de deux with the government who 
imposed wide-reaching restrictions on its day-to-day operation. In the early 
2000s, popular social media was still yet to make its appearance – Facebook 
was founded in 2004 and Twitter 2006 – so print and electronic media played 
a significantly influential role in shaping public opinion and perception. 
This became crucial and worrisome when political and public figures with 
respective political agenda were able to manipulate those in various media 
organizations.
Indarwati Aminuddin, in her research article dated and published on 4 
November 2002 in Pantau,11 recounts that during the 1997 monetary crisis 
leading up to the May 1998 violence, many print and electronic journalists in 
Indonesia were invited by a government team consisting of representatives 
of Trade and Industry Ministry, police officers, and attorneys, to join them 
in raiding store-rooms owned by Chinese Indonesian businesses. Once 
there, the print journalists promptly made copious notes of the foodstuffs 
stacked, the camera crews of the invited television channels began rolling, 
and voilà, ready-made news scapegoating Chinese Indonesians as hoarders 
of foodstuffs which should have been sold in the marketplace, were spread 
to the public. Aminuddin continues, that there seemed little effort on the 
part of the journalists to investigate the real reasons for the crisis, not being 
entirely comfortable with explaining the significance of the plummetting of 
the Thai baht against the US dollar in August 1997, so with deadlines fast 
approaching, it would have been easier to grab what was staring them in the 
face (the expression is my own). The result was predictable: the intensification 
10 Author’s translation. The original quotation: “Ini kepentingan Anda (pengusaha Tionghoa-red), 
saya bilang. Kalau banyak orang miskin, banyak pengusaha kaki lima yang didorong-dorong kiri kanan, 
tahun depan siapa yang akan dia bakar? Anda yang akan dibakar. Suka mana? Suka didiskriminasi 
atau suka kau dibakarin, diburu-buru. Anda enak bawa duit keluar negeri, kalau terjadi apa-apa”. See 
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/ berita_indonesia/2014/06/140610_lapsus_tionghoa_satu_
atau_dua. 
11 See http://www.pantau.or.id/?/=d/231.
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of resentment toward Chinese Indonesians as a whole, and Aminuddin (2002) 
points out, this resentment largely contributed to the May 1998 violence.
“Ethnic profiling” is a term generally used in terms of policing and criminal 
spotting.12 If the term could be expanded for the purpose of this article, it would 
become apparent that for three decades Chinese Indonesians were subjected 
to ethnic profiling in news items. News reporting, especially concerning 
despicable acts involving individuals of Chinese ethnicity as perpetrators 
or agents, made the said persons’ ethnicity very clear by employing various 
ethnic markers.13 The practice even continued after the onset of Reformasi. 
This has been done with impunity, to the extent that some have done it, or at 
least claimed to have done it unconsciously, that is, with no malice. In other 
words, it became second nature to them.
In reporting a particular event, some of these ethnic markers were explicitly 
mentioned while others were implied, such as in the following example. A 
news item in Tempo News Magazine (Tempo, Majalah Berita Mingguan) recounts 
an incident in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi, in August 2001.14 The report begins 
with the scene at the Mandonga Market in Kendari where a crowd of 2000 
or so showed up expressing their anger, throwing stones at dozens of shops 
owned by Indonesian citizens of Chinese-descent. Toward the middle of the 
report the reader understands why this group of people became the object of 
public ire. It was triggered, the report says, by news of inhumane treatment 
committed by the wife of the owner of an automobile repair shop – both of 
whom were Chinese-descent – on their three household servants who were 
non-Chinese. So it appears that the reference to the perpetrator’s Chinese 
ethnicity is relevant. 
Two local newspapers at least, reported the event: Kendari Ekspres and 
Kendari Pos, where the word “Chinese” was not mentioned. The perpetrator 
was referred to instead, as “citizen of descent” (warga keturunan), which 
according to Aminuddin who is of Kendari origins,15 in Kendari means 
“Chinese”. And Aminuddin also mentions in her article that as soon as news 
of the assaults spread, the locals immediately assumed that the perpetrator 
was Chinese-descent, deducing also from the fact that she and her husband 
owned an automobile repair workshop – part of local, widespread nonetheless, 
community’s ethnic-profiling. 
The news quickly evolved into an issue of “Chinese versus indigenous” 
conquest. Chinese Indonesians in Kendari, directly involved or not, promptly 
issued a public apology via the media. However residents of Raha Regency, 
where the three young women came from, were in no state to be appeased. 
The situation had turned dangerously volatile. All shops belonging to Chinese-
descent people were closed. Security was visibly tightened. Threatening, 
protesting crowds filled the street, yelling and shouting, “Burn the Chinese! 
12  See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Ethnic+profiling.
13  See http://sociology.about.com/od/E_Index/g/Ethnic-Marker.htm.
14  See Aminuddin 2002: http://www.pantau.or.id/?/=d/231.
15  See http://www.pantau.or.id/?/=d/231.
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Hang the Chinese! Destroy them!” Windows of shops and houses were 
shattered. Seeing how the situation progressed, observes Aminuddin (2002), a 
group belonging to a non-governmental organization, Women Care Coalition 
(Koalisi Peduli Perempuan), later withdrew from the protest action. “We are 
worried. The protest turned into an anti-Chinese action”, explained Wa Ode 
Deli Yusniati of the Coalition.16 “We want nothing to do with that. We are 
only concerned about the physical assaults perpetrated on the women by their 
employer”.17 An astute observation, it appears, by Yusniati and and a quick 
action by the organization.
Before even the perpetrator was taken to court, she, and unfortunately the 
whole ethnic Chinese segment of the society, were already pronounced guilty, 
and continued to carry the epithet of “ungrateful people” as they were still 
regarded as not belonging to the land, regardless of the number of generations 
their families had lived there.
In media reporting, and in everyday conversations, it had often been 
assumed that Chinese Indonesian business practitioners would not hesitate 
to commit, even initiate, corruption, colllusion and nepotism in their dealings 
with officials. In reality, given the same circumstances, many non-Chinese 
business practitioners have been known to behave similarly.
Though slow to react, at least large media organizations began to tone 
down their use of ethnic markers in their reporting. The slowness may have 
been caused by the fact that the journalists and the editors had become 
genuinely persuaded that each inclusion of ethnic markers was indeed relevant 
to the story involved. An example in this case, is Aminuddin’s interview in 
2002 with Bambang Harymurti, then editor-in-chief of Tempo News Magazine. 
Harymurti emphazised that the publication only mentioned the ethnicity 
[read: Chinese ethnicity - author’s addition] in its reporting if it was relevant, 
and that there was no undercurrent of prejudice, let alone malice, on the part 
of the journalists or editors.18 In fact, one of the journalists who had fielded 
protests from some readers for using an ethnic marker, Harymurti points 
out, was himself a Chinese Indonesian. This really shows how deep in the 
collective subconscious of the people the stereotype of Chinese Indonesians 
was. Many things had then been accepted as normal hence perceived, correctly 
or incorrectly, as without malice.
Since public sentiment, and sentiment prevailing among media 
practitioners, tended to feed each other, if there was going to be change, it 
would have to occur on both sides, roughly in a concurrent manner. It is 
difficult however to make quantitative assessment of public sentiment without 
a thorough and extensive research, which is beyond the scope of this article. 
On the other hand, time has shown that there have been definite attempts 
16 “Kami mulai khawatir kok demonya jadi anti Cina?” keluh Wa Ode Deli Yusniati (Aminuddin 
2002: http://www.pantau.or.id/?/=d/231).
17 “Padahal persoalannya kan hanya penganiayaan majikan pada pekerjanya” (Aminuddin 2002: 
http://www.pantau.or.id/?/=d/231).
18 See http://www.pantau.or.id/?/=d/231.
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on the part of the media to rectify the almost impasse situation. News items 
put out by at least quality media organizations began to show careful and 
discriminating use of ethnic markers. What is more, there have been more 
feature stories depicting explicitly Chinese cultural aspects and cultural 
events around the country, as well as more favourable reporting on Chinese 
Indonesians and their lives, and crucially, their contribution to nation building.
For example, when 2003 Chinese New Year (after it was declared as a 
national holiday) was openly and sumptuously celebrated, the celebrations 
were widely covered, by the country’s print and electronic media. There 
appeared to be gesture of considerable mutual nods on the part of the media 
and the public respectively. And since then coverage of Chinese New Year in 
Indonesia has become routine and continuously more varied. 
In similar veins, in 2004, Tempo News Magazine dedicated 56 (excluding 
the advertisement) pages of its 17 August (Indonesian Independence Day 
commemoration) Special Edition to stories, historical background, interviews 
and columns on Chinese Indonesians, with no hint of undercurrent of 
prejudice. This large section is presented under the general heading of “Ethnic 
Chinese in the era of change” (Etnis Cina di zaman yang berubah).19 This gesture 
undoubtedly conveys a message of acceptance of the Chinese Indonesians in 
Indonesian nation.
Among the articles is a brief history under the title “Assimilation not 
mandarinization; while free from social and political shackles, Chinese-
descent Indonesians are not entirely free from problems. Progress has been 
made, but problems still abound” (Asimilasi bukan mandarinisasi; bebas dari 
pemasungan politik dan budaya, masalah keturunan Cina ternyata belum selesai. Ada 
kemajuan, tapi masih lebih banyak persoalan), where a relatively encompassing 
chronological account in a time-line format is included. There are also 
informative and opinionated columns variously from a social scientist, a 
social researcher, a political scientist, a well-known writer, an economic 
affairs observer, and a legal scholar and law officer. One of the columnists, 
Bondan Winarno (2004), in his piece titled “Ethnic Chinese are coming out 
of the closet” (Etnis Tionghoa keluar dari lemari) mentions how ethnic Chinese 
had been turning out writings in various genres in Malay – a language which 
would later be adopted by the young nationalists who instituted the Youth’s 
Oath as Bahasa Indonesia – long before the young nationalists themselves 
who were mostly Dutch-educated, were able to function in the language. 
This is a very important point since writings by ethnic Chinese, while having 
a wide impact on early national political movement, studied and analysed 
comprehensively by French scholar Claudine Salmon(2010), has never been 
officially recognized as part of Indonesian literature.
Featured also, are a number of individuals who have categorically broken 
the prevailing stereotype, such as an artist, art scholar and curator, Halim 
H.D.; an architect who specializes in heritage architecture, Budi Lim; an 
architect specializing in traditional architecture, Eko Agus Prawoto; a very 
19 See Tempo, Majalah Berita Mingguan 17 August 2004 (special edition): 28-89.
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hands-on social activist, Sofyan Tan; a social and human rights advocate, Ester 
Indahyani Jusuf.20 None of these people have been working exclusively for 
Chinese Indonesian communities. They are among those of Chinese ethnicity 
who have defied the stereotype, and have fullheartedly joined the mainstream.
The edition also has stories depicting visual and performance arts with 
Chinese origins which have local elements blended in, executed and performed 
by Chinese and non-Chinese artists and performers, which are well received 
by the local populations where each of them have taken roots. This special 
edition is not the only time Chinese Indonesians are covered in a relatively 
neutral, if not particularly favourable, tone and manner. Tempo News Magazine, 
along with its Tempo daily, has since consistently incorporated aspects of 
ethnic Chinese in its writing or reportage. 
Other large news organizations such as Kompas, Suara Pembaruan, Media 
Indonesia, and the English language The Jakarta Post, and later on, The Jakarta 
Globe, as well as lifestyle publications such as Femina group magazines, and 
later on Globe Asia, also picked up the practice of very visibly including ethnic 
Chinese personalities and cultural aspects in their reportage and features. 
Explicitly negative reporting however, has often been inevitable when Chinese 
Indonesian individuals, high profile or not, committed crimes, white-collar 
or otherwise. 
It is worth noting however, that this increasing tendency to cover Chinese 
features and cultural events may also have been a wise commercial move by 
the media organizations.  Not only would they have attracted ethnic Chinese-
run businesses to place advertisements with them, but the advertisements in 
general would have appealed to consumers particularly in the middle-class, 
a fair segment of which was indeed Chinese Indonesians. Soliciting the 
patronage of these people could now be done without guilt. And this was 
likely to have been more immediate with electronic media.
In terms of impact on public sentiment, electronic media are usually 
more successful and more instantaneous. Print media generally appeals to 
those who deliberately and actively seek out information and to an extent, 
mentally digesting it when they read it. To a limited extent therefore, print 
media helps shape and modify public opinion. In the meantime, while some 
people do exercise their critical minds while watching television, they also 
absorb a lot of images and various messages contained in them subliminally. 
So the process is more insidiously powerful, though not necessarily lasting 
in a wholesome way.
In the case of ethnic Chinese issues, electronic media therefore, has not only 
played a significant role in shaping public sentiment, it has also influenced 
public perception of what is socially acceptable and conversely, what is no 
longer regarded as socially graceful. Television channels began to cover 
Chinese cultural events to varying degrees. Prominent among electronic 
media organizations which have paid serious attention to the issue of ethnic 
Chinese is Metro TV.  Founded in November 2000, it has news broadcast in 
20 See also her brief biography in Anggraeni (2010: 3-32). 
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Mandarin as well as in Indonesian and English, raising the profile of Chinese 
language to a level comparable to English. This was particularly significant 
considering that up until 1998 public use of the language, along with display 
of other aspects of Chinese culture, had been prohibited. Metro TV has one of 
the most comprehensive coverage of Chinese New Year celebrations, including 
those of Cap Go Meh (fifteen days after the New Year’s day). It even often goes 
further and deeper than “show” cultural aspects. In July 2011, in one of its most 
popular programs, Kick Andy, presenter Andy Noya canvassed the issues of 
ethnic Chinese stereotyping, featuring among others, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, 
known affectionately as Ahok, who would become the Governor of Jakarta, 
who was then the Mayor of Bangka Belitung, with Natalia Soebagio of the 
University of Indonesia taking part in the participatory audience discussion.
In conjunction with conventional media, online media also took off, which 
took a fair segment of readership off the hardcopy editions. As it caters for 
more or less the same readership as its print sisters, online media also has 
treated the ethnic Chinese issues with even-handedness.
MedIA wItH quIcK feedbAcK
Web-logs, popularly known as blogs, have also made their appearance. 
While blogs have their limitations, on topical or hot issues they have stirred 
up meaningful discussions, some reasonably heated. In the case of Chinese 
Indonesian issues, there have been from time to time blogs which draw 
comments and debate. For instance one particular blog, posted in 201121 did 
attract many (continuing until the present day) feedbacks, forming a kind of 
cyber group therapy. There have also been blogs which are informative and 
contemplative.22 Though blogs have limited reaches, they have contributed 
to the change toward social and political openness, and though limitedly, in 
breaking down the stereotype which shackled Chinese Indonesians in the past. 
When social media began to rear its head in mid 2000s, it was at first 
saturated with personal stories and gossip. While this situation still continues, 
the exponential growth of Facebook membership (1.79 billion active users 
recorded in the third quarter of  2016)23 has allowed a great deal more to 
be posted, though it is also near-impossible to obtain the whole picture of a 
given situation at a given time, as we all depend on the algorithm employed 
by Facebook. Twitter, with 317 million monthly active users recorded in the 
third quarter of 2016, also played an important role in disseminating instant 
news and information.24 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, social media has uncovered 
sufficient areas of the big picture to reflect some interesting phenomena. 
21 See http://anastasiadwirahmi.wordpress.com/2010/11/10/ada-yang-bilang-aku-china/.
22 See for example, http://roedin.blogspot.com.au/2011/09/kehidupan-politik-dan-sosial-
budaya.html.
23 See https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-
users-worldwide/.
24 Https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/.
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Interaction being one of the most attractive features of social media, it usually 
becomes immediately obvious if a particular issue someone posts on his or 
her Facebook wall or Twitter space is worth discussing, and if it is, a picture 
will develop disclosing what people think about it, from the feedbacks or 
comments. One phenomenon for instance, is how the freedom to criticize those 
in power has reshaped the resentment in relation to the Chinese (here, it has 
also become obvious that not everyone in Indonesia differentiates Chinese 
of the People’s Republic of China, or Taiwan, from Indonesians of Chinese-
descent) and their place in Indonesian society. During the New Order rule, 
when the people were able to see blatant corrupt behaviour in the power 
elite, they generally would not dare direct their anger and resentment at 
those in power. Instead, they aimed their ire at the ready proxy: the Chinese 
Indonesians who colluded with them by paying exorbitant bribes, who 
along with the officials receiving the bribes, benefitted from this collusion. 
Unfortunately the people were not very discriminating in their attacks; as a 
result any Chinese Indonesians were vulnerable, be they guilty of collusion 
or not. 
Now we are seeing an interesting ground shift. While Chinese Indonesians 
have not really moved far from the target, the government, current president 
Joko Widodo rather, has moved closer to the target board. Known, justifiably 
or otherwise, for his closeness to China, President Widodo has been put 
under the spotlight in a number of news reports. Regional Legislative Council 
A.M. Fatwa in his comment as quoted on 29 January 201625 in an online news 
service for instance, accused the president as being subservient to Chinese 
Indonesian property business operators. This was in relation to his office 
allegedly expediating the US $5.5 billion project of Jakarta-Bandung fast-rail, 
which was funded by the People’s Republic of China’s capital. Thus Fatwa 
implied that Chinese Indonesians were identical to the People’s Republic of 
China. He said (as reported)
Joko Widodo may have won the 2014 presidency, but the real power holders 
were the taipan [a term used for Chinese Indonesian big business operators].26 
He then continued (as quoted),
Nearly 80 percent of our economy is dominated by the taipan. I am not racist, 
but that is what happens. This means that every government project is coveted 
by those taipan. Once again, I am not racist because my second wife is Chinese-
descent.27
25 It was quoted by http://www.inilah.com.
26 “[…] meski Joko Widodo menang dalam Pilpres 2014, namun pemegang kekuasaan yang sebenarnya 
adalah para cukong alias taipan-taipan properti yang ada di Indonesia”.
27 “Hampir 80 persen perekonomian kita dikuasai para taipan. Bukan saya rasis, tapi ini benar terjadi. 
Artinya, setiap proyek pemerintah pasti tak akan lepas dari intaian para taipan-taipan itu. Sekali lagi 
saya tidak rasis karena istri kedua saya keturunan Tionghoa”.
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What is different now, post New Order era, is that, when that news item was 
posted on Facebook, it received feedback of different opinions. While some 
comments cheered Fatwa’s accusing statements, there are those who called 
for a more cautious analysis of the situation. Only one, interestingly, pointed 
to the fact that it was Chinese state-owned enterprise which was funding 
the fast-rail projects, not Chinese-descent Indonesian citizens, as alluded by 
the legislator with a Chinese-descent second wife. He may have indeed been 
unaware himself of the difference between China’s Chinese and Indonesia’s 
ethnic Chinese, and may have had President Widodo as his target. Whatever 
his motivation, his use of the “Chinese” issue only shows how Chineseness 
continues to be regarded as an accepted political weapon. 
While the ground shift has not been earth-trembling, it is recognizable 
and indicative of the ever-opening minds of the public vis-ā-vis the nation’s 
ethnic Chinese and their heterogeneity.
In general, both Facebook and Twitter remind us that while the sentiment 
generated by the stereotype never leaves the collective psyche of the 
mainstream population, at any given time issues of Chinese Indonesians only 
occupy a small fraction of people’s minds, barring the moments when these 
issues are particularly topical. As such, discourse on the place of Chinese 
Indonesians in the nation’s fabric has not had a ground-breaking quality, 
albeit steadily progressing. And the notion of “acceptance” of Chinese descent 
fellow-citizens on the part of the indigenous majority of the population carries 
different meanings in different people’s minds. Hoon (2012: 176-177) writes 
that many of his respondents confounded Chinese culture with decorative 
items associated with the culture, such as red lanterns and the lion dance. So 
they said that they enjoyed the lion dance performance but objected to Chinese 
people speaking Mandarin in public. 
And while the stereotype transcends the different political times, it evolves, 
and inevitably it brings different meanings in different people’s perceptions. 
socIAl ActIvIsts
In the frame of the dismantling of the political shackles put on Chinese 
Indonesians, Indonesia’s social activists have played a pioneering role, 
though they never publicly claim this. Social activists and workers in non-
governmental organizations generally have definite foci in their work. 
However, when May 1998 broke out, activists and volunteers in Mitra 
Perempuan Women’s Crisis Center, Kalyanamitra, Tim Relawan untuk 
Kemanusiaan (The Volunteers Group for Humanity) or TruK, Tim Relawan 
Kemanusiaan untuk Perempuan (The Volunteers Group for Humanity 
Specializing in Helping Women) or TRKP, Suara Ibu Peduli (The Voice of 
Women Who Care), and activist-academics at Program Studi Kajian Wanita 
– Program Pascasarjana Universitas Indonesia, as well as various women’s 
groups who joined the Masyarakat Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan (The 
Community for Fighting Violence against Women), all came out in droves to 
join in various endeavours to help the victims, all the while acknowledging 
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the ethnicity of the rape victims. A group representing the Masyarakat Anti 
Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, led by Saparinah Sadli, founding professor of 
Program Studi Kajian Wanita – Program Pasca Sarjana Universitas Indonesia, 
even went to see and convinced President B.J. Habibie who had only been 
in power for 53 days, to release a statement of condemning the atrocities to 
women perpetrated in May 1998.28
Their concerted action, in helping the victims and obtaining official 
condemnation from the president, conveyed a powerful message to the 
public, that they regarded what had been done to (the mostly ethnic Chinese) 
women was extreme cruelty to fellow-citizens, thus had to be strongly and 
explicitly condemned and the perpetrators brought to justice. Though many 
in the power elite were very disturbed by this, they were unable to ignore the 
message. More importantly, this message has started an irreversible stream 
of solidarity on the part of many in the mainstream community. And this 
solidarity has played a solid and sustainable role in gradually encouraging 
inclusiveness vis-à-vis the nation’s ethnic Chinese.
wrIters, ArtIsts, And scHolArs 
Writers, artists, and scholars move in a different circle from those who work 
in the political segment of life, be they public figures, political leaders or 
political journalists. Creative writers and artists especially, work in the realm 
of people’s subconscious, enhancing or disturbing their existing sense of 
propriety and decency, and often, their comfort zone. In this era of multi-
media information technology however, writers, artists, and scholars, straddle 
the more contemplative work of writing – and in the case of visual and 
performance artists, creating –, and that of more immediate impact-making 
appearances on television. 
Briefly after the May 1998 atrocities broke out, when conventional media 
was still ambivalent about the rapes on the women, a very powerful short 
story, Clara atawa wanita yang diperkosa,29 written by well-known author Seno 
Gumira Ajidarma, dated 26 June 1998, shocked readers throughout Indonesia.30 
And when it was translated into English (titled Clara),31 then into Japanese, it 
shocked readers in other countries as well. Ajidarma, who was infuriated by 
the doubts publicly expressed regarding whether rapes had ever happened, 
wrote an extremely disturbing story about a Chinese Indonesian protagonist 
whom he named Clara, who was sexually assaulted during the May dark 
events, depicting not only the horrific crime, but also the inhumanity, hence 
the humiliation the victim had to face when later interrogated by a very 
insensitive, even voyeuristic police officer. At around the same time, several 
stage performances were also produced in Jakarta and other cities, depicting 
the trauma suffered by the women. While these may have had limitations in 
28 See Anggraeni (2014: 1-16).
29 See Anggraeni (2014: 176-187).
30 See https://www.scribd.com/doc/213685571/CLARA-Atawa-Wanita-Yang-Diperkosa.
31 Translated by Michael Bodden, see Indonesia 68 (October 1999): 157-163.
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terms of the audience they were able to reach, they conveyed a very important 
message of solidarity and caring. Another group which had a limited audience 
in the country yet had brought awareness all the way to the other side of the 
globe was the visual artists who had their works exhibited in Rome later 
that year. These artists were over 70 years old and had never considered 
themselves as “activists” in any manner, yet what happened in May 1998 
shocked and moved them to create images of protests, a definite departure 
from the paintings they had produced so far.32 Many poets were also moved 
to pen heartfelt and eerie poems in solidarity with the victims of the atrocities.
A shift in the whole structure of film-making was also felt following the 
onset of reform. During the three decades of the New Order government the 
place of Chinese Indonesians in the industry was almost firmly on the business 
side, such as financing and distribution. And when Chinese Indonesians were 
actually depicted in films, they were in stereotypical roles, usually as greedy 
business people, speaking with heavily distorted accent, and unscrupulously 
exploiting the indigenous Indonesians that they employed. And at the end 
of the film, they usually repented their evil ways and promised to succumb 
to the official “assimilation” program, which invariably implied shedding 
their Chinese attributes and their disgusting greed and lack of scruples. Films 
made in the 2000s have very different perspectives where Chinese Indonesians 
are involved. Setyadi – a researcher and a documentary film-maker (Sai and 
Hoon 2013: 70) observes, 
[…] as public depictions of Chineseness become increasingly oriented toward 
Mainland Chinese cultural traditions, many ethnic Chinese youth, particularly 
those who grew up in peranakan families, express the inability to relate to such 
cultural signifiers […]. 
Thus, not only did the young Chinese Indonesians turned their back on the 
old “identity politics” of the New Order, but they also began to make films 
themselves, where they were the subjects of the stories, expressing their own 
feelings and views. And it is worth noting that the films the young filmmakers 
produced were well received by critics and reviewers, though not particularly 
a commercial success. Eric Sasono,33 a well-known film-critic, wrote well of 
them, and more importantly, included them in the repertoire of the genre of 
post-reform films.
A number of scholarly works and photographic essays began to appear 
on the subject of Chinese Indonesians, some on the history of particular 
regions, among them Hendri Gunawan’s book on Manado’s ethnic Chinese 
local history Yok Tjae & Chung Hwa; Menelusuri  jejak-jejak komunitas Tionghoa 
di Manado (2013); Erniwati’s Asap Hio di Ranah Minang; Komunitas Tionghoa 
di Sumatera Barat (2007); and Frino Bariarcianur’s photographic essay Demi 
waktu; Potret Tionghoa Singkawang (2005). While most books enlighten readers 
32 See Anggraeni (2014: 176-187).
33 See http://9808films.wordpress.com/media-archive/.
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of the Chinese Indonesians’ place and part in the national history, one book 
particularly worth noting is Manifesto politik Tionghoa di Indonesia by Choirul 
Mahfud (2013), for its implicit inclusiveness of ethnic Chinese as part of 
Indonesia’s multicultural society, which is consistently implied throughout 
the book.
proActIve non-profIt, ActIon-orIented socIAl orgAnIzAtIons
Various organizations, large and small, emerged after May 1998, of which the 
mission was more or less to work toward integration or reintegration of ethnic 
Chinese into the nation’s mainstream society. Two prominent ones have been:
• Perhimpunan INTI or Association of INTI34 (which stands for Indonesia-
Tionghoa), founded in 1999 with the mission to resolve the “Chinese 
problem” - legacy of the New Order rule. The organization runs 
seminars on various topics related to the mission, as well as disbourses 
scholarships to indigenous young people deemed deserving. It also has 
published a number of books.
• Yayasan NABIL or NABIL Foundation,35 founded by a former general 
president of INTI, Eddie Lembong, and his wife Melly Saliman in 
2005. NABIL stands for Nation Building. True to its name, NABIL 
focuses its work on mainstreaming the ethnic Chinese community. 
The regular seminars the organization runs are more multilateral and 
interactive in nature, such as endeavours involving non-ethnic Chinese 
groups, for example Paramadina University, and the Nahdlatul Ulama 
community organization, in working together on knowledge-sharing 
and community-building. It also has a prolific publishing department 
as well as an extensive quality library accessible to those who have 
legitimate needs to use it.
3  tHe rIse of tHe people’s republIc of cHInA In tHe globAl econoMy And 
soMe effects on tHe cHInese IndonesIAn sItuAtIon
While the turn of the century saw increasing cultural breathing space for 
Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese, it also saw China’s growing power in the global 
economy. In fact, in 1999, with its 1.25 billion people but a GDP of just US 
$3,800 per capita, China became the second largest economy in the world 
after the US.36 This naturally raised concern particularly in the United States, 
which felt the danger of its own dominance in the global power declining. 
Inevitably while China’s economy continued to grow, so did its bargaining 
and political power, and in Indonesia and many countries in the region, its 
spread of capital.
This economic dominance has not been lost on those who are globally 
34 See http://www.inti.or.id.
35 See http://www.nabilfoundation.org.
36 See http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf.
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aware, be they ethnic Chinese, indigenous or descendants of other ethnicities 
originating in other countries. And the increasing numbers of people wanting 
to learn Mandarin indicates that there was a growing awareness that this 
dominance indeed offered a wide range of opportunities for Indonesia. For 
example, the Islamic Village Secondary College in Jakarta even included it in 
its curriculum. Anggraeni (2010: 128-129) writes, 
The students at the Islamic Village Secondary College believe that Chinese is 
becoming a very important language in this region. Even in seeking employment, 
they have discovered, being able to speak and write Mandarin would place them 
ahead of others who had no knowledge of Mandarin […].
On the other hand, it has also been apparent that apart from the relative few 
who made it their business to know the difference between China as a nation 
and Indonesia’s own ethnic Chinese, most people are generally unaware of this 
difference. The former consist of academics and scholars whose fields of study 
are in or related to, multiculturalism, international relations and economics; 
business consultants, banking experts, people generally interested in social 
and political issues, and those who had Chinese-descent personal friends. The 
latter are those whose lives hardly have anything to do with ethnic Chinese, 
except on the occasional encounter or small transaction.  To them, people of 
Chinese ethnicity be they citizens of Indonesia or of China or other countries, 
all belong to the same ”pool”: foreign. While this unawareness may not have 
normally fuelled resentment toward the ethnic Chinese in their lives, it could 
easily turn that way, either inadvertently or by design on the part of some 
party or parties with vested interest. 
Reading quality newspapers and more specialist business publications, 
it is apparent that there are at least nine ethnic Chinese and five non-
Chinese Indonesian millionaires with their respective cross-border capitals 
whose business activities have been worth covering. However, some news 
organizations have often alluded to economic domination by the taipan, 
namely ethnic Chinese business owners.  Interesting to note that, according 
to a study by Richard Carney and Natasha Hamilton-Hart,37 in the last two 
years of the New Order era, the millionaires (Chinese and non-Chinese) have 
gradually delisted their companies from the Indonesian Stock Exchange, and 
continued operating them as private companies. Siadari38 observes that this 
phenomenon reflected the decline of the influence of political connection in 
maintaining business stability as it had been in Suharto era. 
However, the notion of Chinese Indonesian businesses influencing 
government policy appears to be maintained by some party or parties in 
order to be used when needed. One example is how the current president Joko 
Widodo’s good relationship with China is depicted by some political and other 
37 See http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/indonesiaproject/files/2015/12/Carney-
Hamilton-Hart-What-do-Changes-in-Corporate-Ownership-in-Indonesia-Tell-Us.pdf.
38 See http://bisnis.news.viva.co.id/news/read/193883-9-taipan--sepuh--terkaya-di-
indonesia.
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public figures, then quoted by a number of media outlets,  as the government 
being influenced by the taipan, having blurred the separating line between 
Indonesians of Chinese-descent and China’s population - those in China as 
well as those visiting Indonesia. An example of this is an article on 23 October 
2014,39 with the headline “Let’s hope Jokowi is not vulnerable to ‘steering’ 
by Chinese taipan” (Semoga Jokowi tak mudah “disetir” taipan China), quoting 
some public figures naming ethnic Chinese business owners, when reporting 
on the new president being congratulated by Yan Jungqi, Vice Chairman of 
People’s Republic of China’s Congress on 21 October. An attempt to blur the 
difference between Indonesia’s own ethnic Chinese and the People’s Republic 
of China is apparent here.
However increasingly, in big cities where people are better informed, this 
type of deliberately designed image is harder to stick or to use for inciting the 
masses. In places where accessibility to less tendentious or biased information 
is not reliable though, this may not be beyond likelihood.  
What has actually been happening is the increasingly closer economic 
ties between Indonesia and China through China-ASEAN Investment 
Cooperation Fund (CAF) or direct investments. And parallel with that, the 
agreements within Asean Economic Community and ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Agreements allow free exchange of technology and skilled workers 
between the participating countries. A result of these agreements is, Indonesia 
is seeing workers from China entering the country. 
Unfortunately there is a drawback, unintended it may be. The sheer 
number of these workers coming, has tested the social and - since they are 
Chinese - political sensibility of local workers, who understandably feel their 
job security threatened. The situation was aggravated by reports that many 
of those workers were not even skilled, as per the terms in the agreements as 
well as the Minister of Manpower and Immigration’s Instruction No. 247/2011 
where it is specified that the only foreign workers who are allowed to work in 
Indonesia are those with and necessary skills. Investigations by Tempo News 
Magazine 40 revealed that the irregularities were in the procurement of licenses 
by officials in the Ministry of Manpower and Immigration. However, to the 
local workers who feel sidelined by Chinese workers, the resentment tended 
to remain with the Chinese in general, ethnic Chinese included. 
General unawareness of the difference between China’s Chinese and 
Indonesian Chinese may play into the hands of party or parties which tend 
to take advantage of ethnicity.
4 perceptIons And stereotype stIll prevAIlIng todAy 
cHInese IndonesIAns perceIved by non-cHInese IndonesIAns
It is safe to assume that there is a broad continuum of perceptions. On one 
end are perceptions held by people who have had frequent contact with 
39 See www.hidayatullah.com 23 October 2014 edition.
40 See Tempo, Majalah Berita Mingguan 31 August 2015, Laporan Utama (Main Items), “Banjir 
pekerja dari negeri Panda” (Workers from the land of Panda flooding in). 
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Chinese Indonesians, and on the other by people who have almost or entirely 
no contact with Chinese Indonesians, whose perceptions are based on the 
prevailing stereotype in their communities or anecdotal stories going around. 
Spread out between them are those with various degrees of combination of 
both. The closer it is to the first end, the denser the personal contents in the 
perceptions, the closer it is to the other end, the less personal the perceptions 
are likely to be, and the more likely the people to be less emotional and maybe 
more objective.
In 2004, for its Independence Day Special Edition, Tempo News Magazine 
interviewed a number of non-Chinese Indonesians regarding their views and 
perceptions about their ethnic Chinese counterparts. The people interviewed 
were those deemed as informed and fair. The editors selected five interviews41 
to be published as they were regarded as representative of the total pool of 
respondents. 
They are all voicing rational and sober views about the ethnic Chinese 
and the current situation in relation to them. They all agree that some 
ethnic Chinese tend to be exclusive and need to socialize more with their 
non-Chinese counterparts. And each respondent has certain aspect(s) they 
emphasize. M.S. Hidayat, (then) General President of the Indonesian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, expresses his observation that the ethnic Chinese 
are not monolithic; they do not express one voice in unison. He also tells of 
knowing ethnic Chinese individuals who are very nationalistic, who even 
express regrets that some of their counterparts who fled overseas after May 
1998 have not returned. 
Hidayat also remarked that May 1998 has taught an important lesson to 
Chinese-descent Indonesians, inas much as the need for introspection and 
behaviour modification. Dea Ananda, an artist, says that as far as the arts scene 
is concerned, ethnic Chinese or non-Chinese share the same room to move. 
However she observes that there are ethnic Chinese who tend to remain in 
their own cliques, and show no inclination to mix with native Indonesians. She 
suggests the ethnic Chinese, living in the nation’s pluralistic society, make an 
effort to understand the cultures of other ethnic communities in order to be part 
of the whole society. Eros Djarot, artist and politician, says that the only definite 
change he has seen is the freedom of expression ethnic Chinese have enjoyed 
in the last few years. But he has not seen real integration happening. He points 
to the practice of monopoly on the part of the ethnic Chinese businesses still 
continuing. He also observes that while many of the ethnic Chinese business 
people complain of discriminative treatment against them, they themselves 
are unfair to their own indigenous employees. He concedes however, that the 
government has tended to use the ethnic Chinese for political and monetary 
purposes, and suggests that that practice should be discontinued because it 
generates resentment toward them. Jusuf Kalla, businessman and (then) Vice-
President candidate says that the discrimination issues against ethnic Chinese 
41 See Tempo, Majalah Berita Mingguan 17 August 2004 (special edition), “Orang Cina di mata 
mereka” (How they perceive the Chinese).
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are dissolving, that they are now free to any cultural expression of their 
own. But he exhorts them to contribute to a clean business atmophere. And 
successful ethnic Chinese business owners, he says, should help and support 
the small business owners, be they indigenous or fellow ethnic Chinese. Indra 
J. Piliang, researcher at CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) 
remarks that he is seeing improvement in the government’s treatment on, 
and attitude toward ethnic Chinese. He states as examples the spectacular 
celebrations of Chinese New Year and the excellent lion dance performances 
throughout the country, and the acceptance of Confucian as an official religion. 
He points out however, that the improvement has not quite penetrated the 
government institutions, citing the continuing requirement for the Certificate 
of Proof of Indonesian Citizenship (SBKRI) as a landmark example.
Hoon’s (2012: 179-190) interviews – conducted by his indigenous research 
assistant, presumably to create a situation more conducive for them to open 
up – reveal more indications of insecurity on the part of the indigenous 
respondents vis-ā-vis their Chinese-descent friends, colleagues, neighbours 
or acquaintance. However, this does not render their observations less valid, 
and they are just as worth listening to and pondering by those observed. 
The interviews were conducted in the latter part of the same year as those 
of Tempo’s, 2004. The respondents were of a younger, but of similar social 
demography to those of Tempo’s. In the interviews they note the positive as 
well as negative aspects of the Chinese-descent people they know, befriend 
or work for.
Of the positive traits they name, the pertinent and prominent ones are the 
work ethics, the clear visions, the determination, the reliable network to which 
they belong, the high discipline, the ability to focus, the attention to detail, 
the rationality and the resilience of the ethnic Chinese. However, positive as 
they sound, these traits could lose their shine when they were held against the 
respondents’ own insecurity, very likely from hearing comments passed by the 
ethnic Chinese individuals they overheard. In fact, an observation expressed 
by several respondents is that they believe that ethnic Chinese see them as 
lazy and lacking in work ethics (Hoon 2012: 181-185). This would most likely 
make them feel reluctant to make friends with Chinese Indonesians. Only 
people possessing a solid self-esteem would voluntarily include individuals 
who had such low opinions about them, in their circles of friends.
The clearly negative traits the respondents name are exclusivity (a very 
persistent perception), excessively hard-working (to the extent of making 
other people feel inadequate), feeling of superiority, having no sense of 
connectedness with their surrounding communities, and reluctance to help 
those less well-off than they are.
One relatively common belief among non-Chinese Indonesians about 
ethnic Chinese, which is not necessarily positive or negative, is that they are 
all rich. This belief can cause problems or at least awkwardness in various 
situations. Ester Indahyani Jusuf in her work as a founder of, and volunteer 
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with Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa,42 often has had to step aside and let her 
indigenous colleagues to go and visit community groups they seek to help, 
because generally as soon as they see a Chinese face (Ester’s), they assume 
they can ask for anything as the ”donor” is infinitely rich.
cHInese IndonesIAns’ self-perceptIons vis-ā-vis tHe rest of tHe populAtIon
Taking into consideration the heterogeneity of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese, 
for the purpose of this article I will roughly divide them into the following 
categories (with a note that these are not discrete groups; there is ample 
blurring and overlapping):
• The young adults to early fifties and mostly tertiary educated, who 
generally feel optimistic about the future. These people regard 
themselves as Indonesian, Chinese-descent, cosmopolitan all at once. 
They socialize with peers of different backgrounds, and are not easily 
non-plussed at hearing unflattering stereotype about themselves, 
because they are aware that other groups also have stereotypes 
attributed to them. Metro TV’s Xinwen Chinese-language program 
presenter Candy Natazia Jorian, is one example. Of her sense of identity, 
she said in 2008.43
  
Personally, I think of myself as an Indonesian. Sure, I have a Chinese name 
and am of Chinese descent, but I don’t consider myself a Chinese citizen 
or anything of the kind. I’m Indonesian. It says so on my ID card, and on 
my passport. And anywhere I go, whoever I meet, I always declare myself 
as first and foremost an Indonesian citizen.
• The ones who have had frequent difficulties in relation to their ethnicity. 
These people are unable to be sure of their own place in Indonesian 
nation and society. At the same time they are aware that they do not 
necessarily belong to China either. This sense of displacement or living 
in limbo renders their lives unpleasant, and their suspicions of the 
world around them in turn make them appear aloof. An example is 
a respondent of Dawis (2009: 120-121). Dawis named this respondent 
Yuny, who recounted feeling fear and discomfort as a child whenever 
she wandered outside her house. She knew she stood out. She had 
fairer skin than many of the indigenous children who lived in the 
neighbourhood, and often had to field yells of “amoy”44 from those 
around her. Her parents thus tried to protect her by having a servant 
accompany her each time she went outside. This only alienated her 
further.
42 See Anggraeni (2010: 29).
43 See The Jakarta Post, Weekender (February 2008): 20.
44 Amoy (meaning: young woman) is used to describe a Chinese or Chinese-looking young 
woman, and often used to call out to young women in a derogatory tone, causing the target(s) 
to feel uncomfortable, humiliated, even physically threatened.
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• The ones who have had difficulties in relation to their ethnicity, and 
believe that they are never accepted in Indonesia, so always look to 
China for moral support. These people continuously look for signs that 
China is becoming strong and dominant in the world because it makes 
them feel that even notionally, there is somewhere for them to go if it 
becomes impossible for them to continue living where they are.45
• Those who have been personally impacted by the violence generated by 
PP1046 and/or by the atrocities of May 1998, yet not necessarily trusting 
of China coming to rescue them either. Those who can afford it, take 
what may appear to be drastic steps. For example, Lin Che Wei, Director 
of The Independent Research and Advisory, recounted to Tempo News 
Magazine in 200447 why he decided to be a “weekend daddy”.  When 
May 1998 broke out, he was working for Société Générale Securities 
Services. On 12 May shots were fired at students gathered at Trisakti 
University campus. On 13 May burning, looting and general destruction 
were perpetrated on business and residential areas in Jakarta, and later 
on it was revealed, horrific rapes as well. At hearing the news Che Wei 
left his office. His house was not very far from that of Liem Sioe Liong, a 
major target. When he arrived in the area he saw Liem’s house already 
decimated. Luckily his wife and two children had earlier on evacuated 
to temporary safety. Toward the end of the day, when the mayhem had 
begun to subside, he took a motorcycle and rode in front of his family 
car taking them to a hotel in Jalan Thamrin to stay. Two days after that 
he took his still distraught family to Singapore to live for an indefinite 
length of time. And he would commute to Jakarta for his working days 
and return to Singapore for the weekends.
• The ones across age-brackets who have to varying degrees had 
difficulties in relation to their ethnicity, but nonetheless are determined 
to be philosophical and remain mentally and morally Indonesian, living 
and working in Indonesia, while not denying their Chinese heritage.48
45 Recounted to the author in informal conversations and correspondence with Chinese 
Indonesians from 1998-2015.
46 PP 10 was a law passed by the government in November 1959, which prohibited foreign 
nationals from doing retail business in rural areas and required them to transfer their businesses 
to Indonesian nationals by 1 January 1960. Unfortunately during its implementation properties 
belonging to ethnic Chinese, who at the time were still unclear of where they stood in relation to 
their citizenships, were destroyed, and a number of Chinese were killed. This drove significant 
numbers of Chinese Indonesians to flee to China.
47 See Tempo, Majalah Berita Mingguan 17 August 2004 (special edition), “Bertemu ayah di 
akhir pekan” (Seeing dad at weekends).
48 Information recounted to the author’s during informal conversations and correspondence 
with Chinese Indonesians from 1998–2015.
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It is not easy to determine the actual size of each category mentioned above, 
because they are likely to swell and contract depending on the political and 
social atmosphere of the moment. If I were to speculate however, I would 
say that the first and the last have been increasing in size in the last decade.49 
This has lately been much abetted by prominence of the current Governor of 
Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, known popularly as Ahok, who has been 
able to break the existing stereotype to pieces as far as he is concerned, as 
regardless of his political leanings or modus operandi, he has proven to be 
consistently nationalistic, politically courageous, taking social justice seriously, 
and most importantly, uncorrupt. While he has a sizeable body of detractors, 
his acceptance by the mainstream population has been manifest. He has never 
denied or concealed his Chinese heritage. In fact, he is happy with people 
calling him Koh (Hokkien for older brother) or Pak Ahok. If Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama can be globally held up as an example, it may prove that it is not 
necessarily the Chineseness most people dislike in Chinese Indonesians, but all 
the negative attributes carried by the stereotype, be they based on reality or not. 
Nonetheless, recent events have indicated that while the negative attributes 
of the stereotype are not necessarily all true or a hundred percent accurate, 
they can still be called upon for political purposes by parties aggrieved by 
certain political or economical developments.50
We have learned that there has been a concerted effort on the part of the 
authorities as well as the community, to open up to Chinese Indonesians and 
include them and their cultural heritage in the national culture in general. 
This has generally been welcome by the Chinese communities themselves. 
Susi Susanti was quoted publicly on 22 January 2016,51 “There is no longer any 
discrimination. We have progressed. Things are now more open and better”.
 
conclusIon
Over sixteen years have passed since the May 1998 atrocities and the onset 
of Reformasi. Reformasi itself has, among other benefits, given Indonesia’s 
49 Information recounted to the author’s during informal conversations and correspondence 
with Chinese Indonesians from 1998–2015.
50 On 27 September 2016, Purnama in a meeting with the local community in Pulau Seribu (in 
the Bay of Jakarta in the Java Sea), exhorted the community not to be swayed by certain religious 
figures quoting the Al Maidah 15 in the Quran to stop them from reelecting him in the February 
2017 regional election. This was later used by a number of religious personalities and groups, a 
prominent one being the Indonesian Ulema Council, to take Purnama to court for blasphemy 
against Islam. A mass rally followed on 4 November in Jakarta, in support of imposing the 
blasphemy charge. A larger albeit more complex one then took place on 2 December 2016, also in 
Jakarta. While not all the religious figures named Purnama’s Chineseness as an important aspect, 
most personalities interviewed on television channels and who wrote in social media, named 
it as a prominent factor for not electing Purnama the second time. Another important angle 
to this issue is, Purnama’s Chinese ethnicity has been highlighted to support the hypothesis 
expressed by a number of public figures that Purnama is the beginning of Indonesia being 
“swallowed” by China, whose economic dominance is spreading exponentially. 
51 See http://sport.merahputih.com/raket/2016/01/22/susi-susanti-diskriminasi-itu-
sekarang-sudah-tidak-ada/37694/.
128 129Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Dewi Anggraeni, Chinese Indonesians after May 1998
ethnic Chinese increasing room to move. While mutual suspicions and distrust 
remain between ethnic Chinese and the rest of the population, the nation has 
come a long way since the times when the ethnic Chinese were held up as 
a national problem as choreographed by the New Order government. Both 
Chinese Indonesians and the indigenous majority of Indonesia’s population 
have undergone a great deal of soul-searching, though a lot more of it is still 
necessary, if a better society is to be achieved. The rise of the People’s Republic 
of China in global economic dominance has had an impact which, when 
manipulated for political purposes by certain parties, can have a negative 
effect on the lives of Chinese Indonesians.
An abundance of good faith however, has been shown toward the ethnic 
Chinese by many sectors of Indonesian society most of which are not ethnic 
Chinese. And this good faith does not only come from groups that benefit 
from ethnic Chinese’s role in the economic sector. A great deal also comes 
from those who seek fairness for all in Indonesia. And a broad appreciative 
response has been shown by the ethnic Chinese for their eventual inclusion 
in the national life and program, though a significant degree of cautiousness 
and insecurity, even ingrained suspicion, still lingers all round.  
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